The occurrence of genocide during war is a serious security predicament facing humanity in modern times, producing civilian casualties measured in millions. The persistence of this heinous crime renders imperative understanding of the effects of genocide in the course of war and its aftermath, effects that this paper examines in the context of the Srebrenica genocide of July 1995 -the darkest moment in European history since the Holocaust. The analysis is grounded on a critical examination of the concept of genocide and its close connection with war. It shows that relations of power are central to the happening of genocide and the ways of dealing with it in the post-conflict setting. When embedded on asymmetrical relations of power, war can be conducive to genocide because it creates organizational, political, and psychological conditions that facilitate large scale killing of targeted people. Whilst in the course of war genocide benefits the perpetrators, in the aftermath of fighting genocide can lend credence to the victims' community demands for recognition, accountability and redress. At the same time, the perpetrators and their community -frequently -deny genocide with the view to avoiding responsibility and reparations. The instrumental utility of genocide reflects rationales that go at the heart of enhancement of national identity and (contested) claims for political authority and legitimacy. More than twenty years after the Srebrenica genocide, these competitive and divisive claims do not bode well for Bosnia's societal cohesion and transition to sustainable peace.
Introduction
Genocide-the worst crime known to mankind-hurts humanity by very large scale casualties, frequently incurred in times of war. 1 The coupling of genocide with war constitutes a serious security predicament in modern times, exemplified by the cases of World War II (WWII) which enabled the Nazi genocide of approximately six million Jews-the Holocaust, and the 1994 civil war in Rwanda which enabled the genocide of eight hundred thousand Tutsis-killed at a rate three times faster than that of the Jews during the Holocaust. 2 Another example pertains to the 1992-95 Bosnian War which led to approximately one hundred thousand people dead and over two million displaced, including the worst massacre in the European history since killed in just one week. 3 In recent years, the genocidal attacks of ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fil 'Irāq wa ash-Shām (known as the so-called 'Islamic State') against Yazidi civilians in Iraq and Syria have taken genocide at a distinct level associated with the political aims-and capacityof a violent non-state actor, a capacity frequently thought to belong only to states. 4 Given the recurrence of this crime, understanding the effects of genocide in the course of war, and its aftermath, is an imperative.
This paper assesses the role of genocide both in the course of war and its aftermath in the context of the Srebrenica genocide (July [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 1995) grounding the analysis on a wide range of interdisciplinary sources from conflict and peace studies, politics, sociology, and law. In over two decades since the ending of the war, the people of Srebrenica-and of Bosnia-have lived with the impact of that fateful event. Their rather common sentiment of 'unsettled scores', the idea that the war is not over yet, reflects discontent with the post-war setting. Hence the present participle 'ending' in the title of this contribution suggests some continuity from war to the present fragile peace, and implies discontent that is mediated-amongst other factorsby (divergent) interpretations of genocide.
This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between genocide, war, and peace. It shows how interpretations of genocide-including its meaning-affect formulations of both war and peace. In Bosnia's setting, the paper demonstrates that the Srebrenica genocide has been a factor both in the ending of war and the constitution of interethnic relations in the ensuing peace. The analysis proceeds as follows: the first section explores the etymology of genocide and its correlations with war. Following an overview of the place of Srebrenica in the Bosnian War, the analysis then subjects to critical scrutiny the centrality of Srebrenica to the genocide debate and its effects on the constitution of knowledge about war atrocities. The penultimate section sheds light on the impact of genocide on national identity. It spells out, on the one hand, the utility of genocide commemorations for the enhancement of the community of victims' national identity and their demands for moral authority and redress. On the other hand, it shows that the denial of genocide by the community of perpetrators challenges survivors' claims and their political agendas. The conclusion draws these strands together and points out that inter-ethnic tensions bode ill for Bosnia's social cohesion. In particular, contentious interpretations-and denial-of the Srebrenica genocide hold the present hostage to a disputed past and constitute a stumbling block to transition of the country to a durable peace.
Genocide, war and its aftermath
The term 'genocide' was first coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish jurist, as a combination of the Greek word 'genos' which means 'race' and the Latin word 'cide' which means 'to kill' in his 1944 book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe-one of the first detailed documented accounts of war crimes perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jews and other groups in the course of WWII. He realized that these crimes were so heinous that exceeded criminal offences framed in existing international law, which assumed that war was fought between states rather than states against a section of their own people, as was the case of Germany which, guided by Nazi 9 The phrase 'in whole or in part' was understood by both Tribunals to mean the destruction of a significant portion of the group from either a quantitative or a qualitative standpoint. 10 Subsequently, genocidal intent may be manifested in two ways: it may consist of desiring the extermination of a large majority of the targeted group, in which case it would constitute an intention to destroy the group en masse; or it may consist of the destruction of a more limited number of persons, such as the leadership of the group, or male members, chosen by the perpetrators for the impact that their disappearance would have upon the survival of the group as such. 11 The ICTY has maintained that the geographical zone in which an attempt to eliminate a group is made may be limited in size. This conforms with the idea that in the pantheon of evil, genocide evokes greater condemnation than do other offences such as crimes against humanity or war crimes. 17 Scholarly and legal opinion remains divided nonetheless on the interpretation of the size of the group with both strict and expansive interpretations-as defined above-being offered by scholars and legal experts. 18 Although the question of the terminology is not entirely resolved, there is wide consensus on the close connection of genocide with war. 19 In the strict definition of genocide, virtually all cases have occurred during war. The connection of genocide with war is frequently mediated by the state, in the sense that most modern acts of genocide have been highly organized, officially sanctioned campaigns-directed at defenceless and unresisting civilians-in the midst of an intra-or inter-state war. 20 Indeed, the main perpetrator of genocide has been almost always a state, genocide being a negative expression of state power and a display of state monopoly of power. A state-sanctioned affair in the midst of fighting, genocide has relied on war in many ways. In all examples mentioned above, war has offered social, political, strategic and psychological conditions conducive to genocidal killing. War can also play a role in masking genocidal activities and attribution of deaths by the perpetrators to 'casualties of war'. 21 War creates organizational, political, and psychological conditions that facilitate the outbreak of genocide. Whilst war increases vulnerability of civilians, especially of the targeted groups, in war times government power becomes more centralized, using censorship and propaganda to increase support for its belligerent policies. 22 Genocidal governments have consistently utilized military force for the purposes of perpetrating genocide. 23 Moreover, those engaging in genocide use ideology-nationalist, racial, or religious-to define people targeted for purging and elimination. Like war, genocide may be justified by a fear of a threat connected with the targeted people, which might be illusionary or real. Victims are dehumanized and perceived as lying outside the moral obligations of the perpetrators. They are frequently portrayed as subhuman and evil, and thereby-from the perpetrators' point of view-deserving death. 24 Getting rid of the adversary has not necessarily been simply an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. Genocide, therefore, can be seen as a state's political and military instrument to achieve an end-frequently conceived to maximize the efficiency of a conquest. Indeed, in the course of war, including the Bosnian War of 1992-95, the motivation of the genocidaires have been at least twofold: to accomplish war aims of acquiring territory cleansed of undesired peoples and simultaneously improve the chances of negotiating a favourable peace; and enhance solidarity and unity amongst the community of the perpetrators. 25 Hence, in the course of war, genocide seeks to serve what perpetrators perceive to be an intended function of security-although the actual effects of genocide can differ from intended ones. 26 Effects of genocide on societies do not cease when a peace deal is reached to end the fighting.
The purposeful use of genocide continues in the post-war era as a fragile peace takes hold, frequently coupled with (new) expressions of nationalist ideology and new forms of identity politics. Whilst in the course of war, genocide is intended to benefit the perpetrators, in the aftermath of war, genocide can lend credence to the victims' community demands for recognition, accountability, and redress. Yet, frequently, denial of genocide assists the perpetrators' community to avoid responsibility and reparations. These differing usages of genocide on the side of the community of victims and that of perpetrators undermine societal cohesion and prospects of sustainable peace. Moreover, the instrumental uses of genocide in the post-conflict setting reflect rationales that go at the heart of (contested) claims for political authority and legitimacy, a point that will be explored below in the Srebrenica's setting.
Place of Srebrenica in the Bosnian War
The place of Srebrenica in the Bosnian War is such that it is not really possible to think of one without the other. As Mark Danner has observed: just like 'the world is contained in a grain of sand, so the war in Bosnia is contained-in the barbarity and the disinclination of the "civilized world" to stop it-in the massacre at Srebrenica'. 27 In the international perception, the interrelation between the Srebrenica genocide and the Bosnian War may have been cemented on those faithful days (11-19) of July 1995, but such intertwining on the ground certainly preceded those dates. The complex causes of the Bosnian War have been examined in many studies and will not be revisited here due to lack of space. 28 The purpose of this section is to emphasize how the Srebrenica genocide manifested a key feature of the Bosnian War, namely the policy of ethnic cleansing in its most severe expression, and how Srebrenica embodied the flawed international response to this war in the form of the so-called 'safe areas' and ultimately the failure of peace-keeping, which in the face of genocide induced a more decisive response from the international community that became crucial both to the conclusion of the genocide and the war.
Srebrenica has been repeatedly subjected to ethnic cleansing during the war prior to the fateful month of July 1995. In many ways, Srebrenica epitomizes the main criminal feature of the Bosnian War, especially related to the first year of fighting (1992-1993) during which most non-Serbs were forced out of Serb-controlled territory, and majority of killings, rapes, tortures, etc., occurred. 29 The most tragic, and prolonged armed conflict on European soil since WWII, the Bosnian War was characterized from the outset by a policy of ethnic cleansing centered on forceful expulsion of targeted communities as a means of controlling territory and resources by the perpetrators and their ethnic kin. 30 A town in Eastern Bosnia-a region bordering Serbia-Srebrenica was geo-strategically important for establishing territorial continuity between holdings of the Bosnian Serb Army in eastern Bosnia and Serbia proper. According to the ICTY as early as mid-May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Political and Governmental Organs had adopted the goal of eliminating the Drina River as a border separating eastern Bosnia from Serbia by establishing a foothold in the Drina River valley. 31 Occupied by the Serbian forces in April 1992, the majority Muslim population of Srebrenica was expelled in the course of this takeover. In May that year, the Bosniak forces managed to take control of the town, turning it into a base for Muslims expelled from their homes elsewhere in Eastern Bosnia, and also for Bosniak fighters who aimed to join Srebrenica with other small enclaves with substantial Muslim population. 32 The crowded town's population lived in calamitous conditions, at times relying on Bosniak raids in neighbouring Serb villages which occasionally led to Serb casualties. 33 The ICTY sources show that in November 1992, the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) area that should be free from armed attack or any other hostile act'. 36 The 'safe area' model was then expanded to other cities and towns-Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Žepa, and Goražde-and appeared, initially at least, to be central to UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia. Nonetheless, the hope that 'safe areas' would provide protection of civilian population was short lived.
Indeed, no viable protection could be offered by lightly armed, small UNPROFOR units with no mandate to enforce peace. Protection of 'safe areas' was a job for combat-capable, peaceenforcement operations, but the UN troops on the ground were given only a peacekeeping mandate-a strategic incompatibility, since there was no peace to keep and civilians were increasingly the targets of violence. Srebrenica, therefore, exposed the flaws of the 'safe areas' policy, and the lack of international commitment to defend them. Muslims of Srebrenica by forcibly removing the women, children and elderly men. In the night of July 11 and the morning of July 12, this plan expanded to encompass the killing of the ablebodied men and boys. 40 In the ensuing days-July 12-19-at least 7,661 Bosniak men and boys were killed and tens of thousands of civilians, mostly women and children, were expelled to central Bosnia in a systematic and accelerated campaign of ethnic cleansing that now is widely recognized to meet the constitutive elements of the actus reus of genocide. 41 This darkest moment of the Bosnian War represents a monumental failure of peacekeeping.
Members of the Dutchbat themselves 'facilitated the crimes in the enclave', 42 helping Serbian troops to separate men and boys, on one side, from the female and elderly population, on the other, and expelling the latter. 43 The fall of Srebrenica-in the presence of the UN peacekeeping troops-and the massive loss of civilian life brought genocide back to Europe after some fifty years since the Holocaust. In marking the failure of the aspiration 'Never Again' the Srebrenica genocide meant a serious loss of prestige for the United Nations and was one significant factor that stirred the international community into a more decisive action to end violence. This constitutes another aspect in which Srebrenica is central to the Bosnian War.
The fall of the enclave and the failure of the UN to protect its civilian population was a culmination of a pattern of tepid international response to the war marked by reluctance of the Great Powers to intervene. But just few days after the fall of Srebrenica, the United States made the robust decision to use force to end the Bosnian War. 44 qualify' as crimes against humanity, 'categorizing them as "genocide" seems to distort the definition unreasonably'. 53 Prosecutor's contention that the intent in killing the men and boys of military age was to eliminate the community as a whole was accepted by the Trial Chamber. 54 However, Schabas suggests that this conclusion was a rather 'enormous deduction' and contends that the group 'could have been targeted precisely because they were of military age and thus were actual or potential combatants'. had upon Bosnian Serb leaders, acts which, in effect, rendered Serbia an accomplice in the Bosnian War. 56 The 2007 ICJ judgement did find Serbia guilty for not preventing genocide, not punishing genocide and not cooperating with the ICTY. 57 However, the judgement restricted Serbia's culpability in that it found that the Belgrade government possessed no special intent to commit genocide in Bosnia. 58 This restriction of Serbia's culpability not only disappointed survivors and some analysts, but it also exposed discrepancy regarding legal consistency of the ICJ reasoning. The ICTY, on whose work the ICJ relied, inferred genocidal intent from factual, circumstantial evidence. Yet although establishing the large extent of
Belgrade support for Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade's strong influence on their ethnic kin in Bosnia, the ICJ did not infer that Belgrade was an accomplice in the Srebrenica genocide or had the intent to commit genocide-showing that the ICJ adopted a strict, conservative interpretation of the term. 59 The space available here does not allow for engaging more elaborately with the elements of the ICJ 2007 judgement and ICTY judgements related to Srebrenica. Overall, assessments of these judgements contain both criticism and appraisal. Second, by singling out only crimes in Srebrenica in July 1995 as a case of genocide in the broader setting of the Bosnian War, the legal body of work produced by the ICTY and ICJ have actually atomized the concept of genocide in the sense that they have inferred that a wider conflict may not be considered genocide, yet a mass atrocity in its midst may be qualified as such. 62 In the opinion of this writer, such atomization has not added clarity to the definitional debate pertaining to genocide. Indeed, this atomization is of some concern to those who adhere-strictly-to the letter of the Genocide Convention because judicial interpretations of the ICTY and the ICJ 2007 judgements have made genocide applicable to situations that differ from the prototype of systematized and massive group destruction, such as for instance the Holocaust that initiated the concept of genocide in the first place. 63 Third, the extraordinary nature of genocide is closely connected not only with the high degree of severity of crimes committed under the umbrella of genocide, but also with the political nature of the offence and also the political response inscribed in the Genocide Convention.
Indeed, codified in the Convention is the duty to 'prevent and to punish' genocide. 64 A genocide occurring in times of war as well as peace requires intervention-a realistic prospect when political will and the national interest of Great Powers allow. Nonetheless, this is not universally the case as Rwanda (1993), Darfur (2000s) and ongoing carnage in the Syrian War attest. 65 Hence, the Srebrenica judgments whilst penalising ex post facto the offence of genocide have also exposed an ongoing reluctance of the international community to discharge the duty of intervention to stop that extraordinary offence, a duty implied in the Genocide Convention.
Politics of national identity: Utility of genocide and its denial
For the people of Bosnia the significance of genocide is not constrained solely to legalistic criteria and court cases pertaining to the massacre of July 1995. Indeed, genocide has become an intrinsic part of who Bosniaks are; the genocide informs ways of thinking both about the past and the present, and conditions how Bosniaks relate to the international community and their former opponents-Serbia and the Serbs. Ever since the occurrence of the genocide, victims have demanded recognition of their ordeal. They have engaged in acts of commemorations-most prominently those at the Memorial and Cemetery Centre at Potočari, the Peace March (Marš Mira), and mass burials acts that exert public recognition of war and suffering, and enhance collective memory and national identity. 66 The significance of commemorations and collective memoralization can be construed not only as a psychological need-an expression of morning, a human response to death and suffering on a very large scale-but also as profoundly political. The political aspect of commemorations lies in the fact that they are a crucial element in the symbolic repertoire available to the national elites for binding citizens into a collective national identity. 67 Numerous works have emphasized the power of commemorations to draw upon the sacrifice and loss occasioned by war and genocide as a means of shaping national identity and preserving, reinforcing, or challenging dominant elites and ideologies within a given state. 68 Suffering incurred in the course of war and genocide can be central to the identity and symbolic continuity of a nation.
As Anderson has stipulated, a nation ensures its symbolic continuity by construing its members as forming an imagined community that surpasses death, whereby the living generations feel their connection with the dead co-patriots thus securing the nation's imagined continuity and transcendence of time. 69 Memory of persecution and suffering has become a crucial marker of Serbian forces in Srebrenica in one month alone. 79 Furthermore, in the post-war setting domestic stakeholders in Serbia have used the Srebrenica discourse in order to define their own political profile for domestic political competition and also discredit political rivals-with the progressivist parties arguing that Serbia needs to strengthen her international position and build its credibility in Europe and nationalists accusing progressivists of 'selling the country out to Europe'. 80 Similarly, for Serbian politicians in Bosnia contestation of the war and events at Srebrenica reflect not only a response to the past, but also a particular standing towards the present. The current Republika Srpska (RS) President-Mr Milorad Dodik-continues to insist that no genocide occurred at Srebrenica. 81 Genocide denial goes at the heart of (challenging) the 
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